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The capital goads industry and the dynamics of economic 
development in LDCs - The case of Brazil.- 
Fabio Stefano Erber 
1 ~ Introduction , 
This paper is addressed to the Giscussion of the role 
of the capital goods industry in the development of a LDC (less-— 
developed country), analysing in some detail the case of Brazil.” 
The second section reviews the role of the capital goods 
industry in the processes of Capital accumulations an@ technical 
progress in an economy whose "stylized carachteristics" are 
drawn from the example of the advanced capitalist economies. It 
concludes with the question whether such conditions are found 
in LOCs. The rest of the paper tries to answer this querry. 
The third section recalls the intellectual background of the “battle for the industrialization" of the LDCs and the 
different roles the capital goods indust ry was ascribed in the development of such countries. 
The three following sections analyse the develop the Brazilian capital goods industry during its phases 
Substitution growth and decline (section 4), 
“Brazilian miracle" (section 5) and the following crisis (section 6}. Their focus is on the development of local production of Capital goods and the role played in such development by the factors suggested by the literature reviewed in Section 3 as warranting the capita) goods production in a Lope. 
ment of 
of import 
the boom of the
ital goods industry to the more general aspects of its pattern capita 
of capitalist development. 
Brazil is the largest producer of capital goods in 
oe maria (China exeluded)+, with a domestic content of hird Wo ld i  ' 
< 
oreo le to that of the advanced countries” and is also supply comparable nce? vert at 
€ the main exporters of capital goads among ’ 
ont , are attributed to local technological development, its whic: 
s as well, is relevant not only on its own but for other LBC case 21 
  
UNCTAD al imal show that Brazil accounted
 far 133 of capit 
a etion in the Third world (China included). Those figures 
est 
probabl cngerastinate the Brazilian share by including in other 
countri 
Figures same consumer goods production. 
(2) See Section 5. 














“goods, everywhere, workers became 
3. 
2 - The capital goods industry and the development of advanced 
capitalist economies . 
The capital goods industry (CGI), i.e. the industry which 
produces equipment and machinery, holds a distinguished place in 
the history of development theory. Analysts of the Industrial 
Revolution, the classical ecanonists gave it a place of honour in 
their explanations of both the specificity of capitalist 
development, of what distinguished it from earlier modes of 
production, and of the strenght of such development. 
Among them, Marx is probably the author which carried the analysis of the role played by the machinery industry in the 
development of capitalism further. He argued that only when the 
preduction of machines was made by Machines, when the capital goods industry was mechanized, the capitalist mode of Production reached its full form as “modern industry". Only then, 
capitalists were able to subordinate workers to machin 
social labour process then becane “objectively" run by 
capital accumulation without the constrain 
"subjectivity" of labour. Throu 
from the production of machines 
he argued, 
ery. The 
the logic of 
ts posed by the 
ghout the whole industrial process, 
to the “machinofacture" of wage 
"appendages to machines" and capital imposed its rationale (Marx, 1968a), the latter led te an increase in the use Of machinery, raising the Productivity of labour but at the same time, tended to decrease the rate Of profit by reducing the share of the 
Surplus (variable Capital} in 7a contradictory process which, according to Marx, was typical of capitalism, Moreover, the relationship between the capital goods industry {together with other industries manufacturing producers goods) and 
ocds (respectively, Departments 
rucial role in the dynamics of 
S analysis o¢ 
Kalecki (1977) would L ater argue that "several of the 
modern theories of growth" e including the Harrod-Domar well-known
. gould be interpreted as “variations over the theme 
of the 
ne heme o£ expanded reproduction” (p.
6), which can be 
eee na by an inter-departamental relationship b
etween profits 
seate cector producing wage-goods and wages 
in the other (s) 3 
{s} and by a relationship between the rate of
 investment an 
re cto ital. This type of relationships have 
in fact been 
Ane ea 3 ex Jain the unstable and cyclical pattern of 
ete ee ot capitalism (see Matthews (19
59) for a review). 
deve Lopmer 
Economic development results from 
the Coa ee ocecces, 
oo umulation and technical progress. The two p: - ' 
Cet ce ulation and technical pr
ogress, are in fact inter 
ae nnd the industry producing machin
ery plays a role as 
eae ne he latter as in the former, Innovations 
in the 
saat good edustiry normally lead to
 an increase in productivity 
ae eee asin its products and i
nnovations in such industries 
OF thee ta th ; voducts or their proce
sses) normally require 
een eines ital goods (which are o
ften modified for such 
cee oe sane the machinery produc
ed for one user can be 
me are by others {eventually with 
adaptations) the capital 
oer ie eeeey ots the main locus for 
the diffusion of 
10OnS ee cycon it ic s stem.* 
The same role is 
, i throughou the economi  
sy 
iat of training manpower. Moreo
ver, if we assume that 
eee snadead progress in the capi
tal goods industry and 
ner ove ve vintages of machinery a
re more productive than 
ner tenes, a investments benefit from 
such increased 
oe eeaiy, expanding effective dem
and and further 
building up a “virtuous circle” 
of capital accumulation 
Se ress (Salter, 1960), 
a hypothesis often put 
ane se expuain the recent develop




chnical progress in the capital goods industry in its Te ag ake part the 
is based on a “collective process" in which take part turn, is 
of machinery, engineering firms, suppliers of parts and purchasers 
iti nd research 
ponents of the machines, and universit es 
a 
cor 
enki (1863) for an extended discussion of the role of 
capital 
m Sede industey in the diffusi






institutes, besides the actual producers of capital goods. When 
carried out in a context where there is considerable division of 
labour this process is carachterized by sinergy - i.e. the result 
is greater than the sum of the parts. Since innovation in this 
industry is based mainly on design and manufacturing technology 
improvements, which develop through time, experience, at the 
level of the firm and of the industry, is a prime determinant of 
innovation capability, raising barriers to entry of new-comers. 
Although computer-aided-design and computer-aided-manufacturing 
have recently expanded, some of the skills necessary to innovate 
in the industry {notedly in basic design) are person-empodiea, 
learned by experience — and transferred from one enterprise to 
another by changes in employment. For such reasons important 
differences may be found between the private and social calculus 
Of costs and benefits of innovating in the capital goods 
industry, warranting State intervention to foster it (Erber, 1977). 
The post-war literature on the relationship between 
innovation and international competition strenghtens further the 
dynamic importance of the capital goods industry. The studies of 
innovations and of their diffusion suggest that they require a 
proximity of capital goods suppliers, especiall: Y in early stages 
of introduction of innovations. Producers of capital goods play 
an important {albeit often poorly documented) role in suggesting improvements in processes and products which Play an important 
role in their customers’ competitive position, 
the innovation is a capital goods itself, 
supplier is necessary to ensure proper tec 
maintenance. Thus, 
Moreover, when 
the proximity to a 
hnical assistance and 
the development of technical capability in the capital goods industry is an important asset in in ternational 
competitiveness. 
Furthermore, exports of capital goods themselves, have become one of the main items of international trade. For the main developed economies (U.S +r Germany, Japan, U.K.) they repre- sented more than 40% of their total exports in 1975, a share which had increased Over the decade (Pajnzylber, 1983). Deve loping countries account for almost all of the export surplus of capital
6. 
i than a fourth of ‘ ad economies, and for wore 
J 
as from develope 
. 
ant 1 world imports. Nonetheless,
 trade between Lpcs = mac
hin ry 
nea i 
t 1979 about 88 o e i t is ncreasing: in d transport equipmen 
3 me 
=e * total imports of such conmod
ities was originated an, 
ove t 
i 982). 
developing countries, from abou  
6% n 1975 (UNCTAD, 1 “we 
_ ts of capital goods from LDCs 
to developed economies : 
. : 
share 
mee limited although the
y represent an important 
7 
See aan eain i 
1d be noticed that only a 
he l ding producers”. It sh
ou : 3 e  
eaited umber of LDCs are 




Neves Singapore, Yugoslavia 






However in order to fulfil
l the dynamic roles 
i a the development 
of capital goods technolog
y ns se the 
a eeueti t be accompan
ied by a parallel developmen
t o 
Pe eectal, vst which is 
able to respond to the inves
tment 
canes of nt cepreneurs 
which underlie the purchase 
of new 
sea goed “( £. Kalecki, 196
8). This is a erucial point to 
ore athe prob lens of
 LDCs in this industry, as
 will be seen 
und rstan 
in more detail l
ater. 
Although he argued that the
 development of ied
 
a necessary condition for th
e developmen ° 
ine alise, did not hold that 
the inverse relationship was 
Cet eae ne geens to hav
e shared the faith of this 
Sere eee t the de
velopment of machinery h
eld the promise 
Pree aati atte drudgery 
and hardship of work, provide
d the ; 
OF evetal ¢ t tions of produ
ction were present, His follower
s, 
ee oe nomhurg (1961), a
rgued that indeed, socialis
m would 
ae ene uae of machine
ry relative to capitalisn. 
Thus - the 
enn ne increasing 
use of machinery in develope
d . 
Cr cane establi
shed that some authors inte
rpret it i 
economies * al trajectories” followed by te
chnical progress 
nour ot vtezatson (Nelson and Wi
nter, 1977). Only more recently, in our civ 
ad been - ture movement, has this tren the counter-cul in the wake or 
advanced countrLes, io 1 which exported to Tespe QQ) Bspect ably Korea and Brazil w of total capital goods exports in 1980 
tively two thinds 
(UNCTAD 1982) . 
-7. 
contested, but with litle practical consequence, as far as one can 
judge. 
3 - The CGI and LDCs - The background 
But, what about the economies which in the early stages 
of development of capitalism had became part of the system in the 
role of suppliers of raw materials and primary products? Ricardo's 
repply was that the law of value and comparative advantages 
operated in such a way that “old countries are constantly impelled 
to employ machinery and new countries to employ labour" (Ricardo 
1973 p.26). This view of relative comparative advantages was 
preserved when the neo-classical paradigm became dominant in the 
present century, in the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samvelison version, and it 
implied different rates of diffusion of the use of machinery and 
different rates of development of local production of capital 
goods (2) , 
As regards the marxist Paradigm, Marx himself, did not spend 
much time on the as subject. Nonetheless, he seems to have 
believed that sooner or later capitalism would spread to the 
former colonies and other less developed countries and, a 
of this process, one can presume, 
would develop?) , 
S part 
a local capital goods industry 
For a while marxist writers followed his lead and held that imperialism would industrialize the les s developed 
countries '3) | 
Nonetheless, from the twenties onwards, an other strand 
in marxist thought prevailed — that capitalism is a fetter on the development of the LDts. Thus, marxist orthodoxy, became 
(1) The assumptions of continuity and substitutability of the neo-classical paradign led to an emphasis on projects and not on sectors (cf.Stewart, 
{2) This is an interpretation based on his 
3 » 1968), 
Of the ideas of the "classics" of inperialisn i wenin) onthe subject. In the twenties L c oOrw: "Imperialism" and Supported the idea that imperialism would not lead to the industrialization of the LOCs. 
(3) See Santi (3973) for a review
that imperialism, alli
ed to the pre-capitalis
ts ten and 
the *comprador” bou
rgeoisie of the LDC
s, were See en 
iat < 
industrialization 
of such economies 
and, therefore, 
° 
t of a local capital g
oods industry. Against
 suc 
nae Seen eaane = th
e “progressive” sect
oxs of society (peas
ants, 
se pere at cart of 
the enlightened urban
 middle class) shoul
d 
Tet re a national 
industrial bourgeoisi
e to industrialize 
and 
un ¢ 
modernize the economy 
and society . 





of the LDC's" wa




€. xy period K
eynes 'dictum tha





j long dead 
economist would 




i and at 
difference that, 
in this case, economists, 
were often alive 
the front line 
too. 
Proponents of indus
trialization of the T
hird Ten chat 
heir prime enemy 
the neo-classica
l paradigm argume 
net 
a : - ctalizat
ion in primary prod
ucts was conducive
 to their 
fee ; erent thus, t
hey attacked at the s
ame time both the 
oer aa 4 terna
tional division of l
abour and the LDC's
 internal 
a ee tive structu
re. Most of them be
lieved that foreig
n 
Piet . wid no




hich would be the 
“historic task” of 
a national 
on ae etcie aided by
 2 clairvoyant stat
e and by a "modern"
 middle 
bee wi the s
upport of workers
 and peasants. The 
majority 
case ee "5 t
imistic view of the
 results of iné@us
trialization 
ae na easi
ng the rate of grow
th of output, income
 and 
i cane * ana redu
cing the politica

















ly proposals of industrialization 
of the LDC's, such 
In ear 
ne forward by Nurkse (1953) and Rosenstein Rodan (1961), as howe r etional supply of capital goods played a secondary role, 
the inter 
view. 
(1) See Varga (1963) 
for a modern restatement 
of this 
De 
since they emphasized the interdependence
 of consumer's demand 
and investment in consumer goods industries as the 
way out of the 
"yicious circle of misery" in which LDC's were entrapp
ed. 
Machinery for the consumer goods industry was to be 
mainly 
imported. 
Other proposals, such as those of the writers belonging 
to ECLA (e.g. Tavares 1964) ©) and Hirschman's (1958) brought the 
capital goods industry to the forefrant. This reversal rested upon 
two pillars: a foreign exchange constraint and the dynamic effects 
of the "vertical interdependence" hetween industries producing 
consumer and intermediary goods and their suppliers of machinery. 
4 - The CGI and import substitution 
The foreign exchange constraint was seen as inherent to the 
specialization of the LDC's in primary goods; as a structural 
datum, resulting from several causes which the LDC's had not the 
power to alter‘? 
The foreign exchange constraint played a double role in 
the dynamics of import substituting industrialization, the pattern 
wich prevailed in Latin America. On the one hand, it spurred 
industrial growth by limiting the amount of gocds which could be 
imported, on the other it placed a limit on such growth by 
constraining the imports of capital goods and other inputs which 
were necessary to produce locally the goods previously imported: 
(1) See Po@riguez (1982) for a detailed and critical review of ECLA's theories. 
{2} Such as the smaller demand - and price - elastic: O£ pri i 25 compared to the growth of denand for namifachaea goods invite te ms 
and sold, the pattern of tech eal een aha ‘coon prod 
old, nO} nd P « which tended i materials, and the different conditions faced by the two types oP ee to sppropriate the results of increased labour productivity due to technical 
_ For a full account of such arguments see Rodriguez hata ellis ana Marlich (eis) (1961) for flair of the discussion ct ine ’ janeiro meti i 
tation im 19S" ing of the International Econanic
10. 
Therefore, in order to keep its momentum, the inport-s
ubstituting 
Q) 
model required a local production of capital goods . 
further,during second half of the fifties.According to Lessa . r . 
(1964), in the pariod 1955/1960 the production of machinery and 
Brazil is one of the countries which carried this process 






machinery over: 2008. Investment in the sector increased 
between 1955 and 1959 (the last year of the period 
which there is data available) gross capital f
ormation in the 





yearly rate of, respectively, 43 and 38% in
 real terms. At the 
same time, the imported component in total supply of ca
pital goods 
declined from 46% in the period 2950/55 to 
an average of 31% in 
the period 1956/62 (Erber ¢t al, 197
4). 
  
Nonehtheless, in Brazil, in 1960, the capital 
goods industry 
accounted for less than ten per cent of 
the value added in 
manuta 
u.S., Germany, Japan, 
cturing industry; about a fourth of the share it 
held in the 
France and the United Kingdom and less than 
third than the share of the Italian capital 
goods sector (see 
mable 1). Indeed, a cross-country comparision 
taking into account 
their (GNPs, (Bergsman and Candal {1960)) suggested 
that until 




was below the international "norm". Although fourteen 
ater the share of the Brazilian capital 
goods industry in 
total manufacturing had increased faster 
than that of the more . 
advanced countries, it was still be
tween a half and a third of 
the share of the ca pital good
s sector inthose countries ‘2) 
(1) ECLA's argument is well sunned by Tavares (1964, p.6) - “it can be asserted 4 
(2) 
i of the import substitution model, it is 
that, given the coible for the industri alization 
process to proceed from 
Ene base to the apex of the production pyramid, that is 
to start with a 
ere 2 consumer and progress gradualy 
until it includes 
non aS Coeds. The substitution process might be regarnied as a building of 
which every storey must be erected simultaneously, alt
hough the degree of 
concentration on each varies from ane period to a
ncther®. 
Our estimates of the share of the capital goods industry i
n total Brazi- 
ndus that the £3, i ial output (12% at the peak in 1977) suggest 
tha gures 
tthe ate fwhich axe for value-added) may be overestimated, 
even 
bearing in mind that the CGI may have a higher than average v
alue - added, 
«tl. 
TABLE 1 - Share of the capital goods industry in 
total manufacturing industry's value added 
for Brazil and selected developed countries 
- 1960 and 1974 - in parcentage 
 
Country 1960 1974 
Gnited States 38.21 42.7 
Japan ~ 31.7 48.5 
Germany 38.2 39.0 
France 37.3 39.2 
United Kingdom 41.1 40.5 
Italy 
29.9 36.5 
Brazil 9.2 14.5 
Source: Fajnzylber (1983), 
The model of import substitution has been often chasticized precisely for its assumption of a rigid foreign exchange constraint and the policies which implemented. such model for their neglead of export possibilities (e.g. Bergsman 1970) . as ECLA‘'s studies warned, the dynamic possibilities of of industrialization were limited even in Brazil, since 
Moreover, 
this type 
enatural resources Scarcities, and/or Problems of minimum 
related to the size of the market. 
process which had produced the great economic expansion of the fifties had also lea to increased Political, social and economi imbalances, expressed hy highly concentrated personal and income distribution, severing in: i gq inflation : J strife, rates and increaseg political 
scale of investments 




and lasted until 1980 
{see Tables 2 to 4). I
n the recent years, 4
 . 
recession to which no
 end is an sight has, 
for the first time 
since the War, re
duced tha Gross I
nternal Product (i
bid) - 
TABLE 2 - AVERAGE YEARLY GROWTH 
RATES OF THE BRAZILIAN ECONOMY 
GROSS INTERNAL PRODUCT AND ITS MAIN







; ; . GIP 
AGRE TRANSPORTS & 
5 - The CGI and the “miracle” =~ 
PERIOD = GIP pgp capa CULTURE «SST COMERS OonICATICNS 
: 7 1968/74 0 
qwo elements carachterize the boom period of 
1968/74 (the “7 10.98 
8,05 53 12,20 11.42 12,69 
iracie"); internally, the role played by 
the durable 1975/ 78 6,36 




¢ 22.5% (see 1973/80 
7,28 4,66 5,65 7,28 
7,31 10,71 
consumer industries, which grew at an yearly 
rate © 1981/82 
4.30 3.64 
’ 
gable 3) and, externally, the favourable 
balance of payment 




conditions, based upon improved terms of trade 
and the availability 1928/82 7,83 
4,83 4,55 7,93 7,08 9,93 
indus tria- 
of credit ) ghus, for the first time in her 
history of indu Source; Malan 
and Bonelli (1983). 
ization Brazil was not facing 4 foreign 
exchange constraint at 
a time of expansion. Imports of capital 
goods were especially 




i 1 finance and over 
valued 
tied-in foreign credits scarcity ot nn prbes 1077, 1982) 
TABLE 3 - BRAZILIAN INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION AVERAGE YEARLY REAL 
exchange rates {suzigan et al. ‘ ‘ 
GROWTH RATES ACCORDING TO USE OF PRODUCTS ~ 1968/82 
. 
IN PERCENTAGE 
As one would expect 
under such conditions, 
imports of capital 
goods soared — during the 
1967/74 period they increased 
367% 
in real terms, an yearly 
rate of 24,6%, their share 
in total 
i ak 
of 41% in 1971 
prazilian imports (oft included) reaching 2 P® 
1968/74 1975/78 . 1979/80 1981/92 TOTAL 
and 1972 (from a fourth in 1965) 
(Malan and Bonelli 1983) (see 
. 1968/82 
Tables 4 and S)- Intermediary 
Products 12,9 6,7 7,0 5,0 7,9 
Capital Goods 
, ’ 
} eco 13,3 8,3 8,3 
-§,2 8,6 
. a e Consumer Products 18,3 6,0 5,8 -14,9 83 
“8 len-Durable Consumer Products 22,5 6,0 
9,2 ~11,3 1 
(1) Brazilian foreign debt gxew from 
US$ 3.8 billions in 1968 to US$ 17.2 
i 
« 1,2 
biLions in 1974- ital goods in Brazil benefited 
“a ah 48 0,2 6,0 
timated that 80 per cent of cap 
‘ 
(2) pages ewes or concessional treatment {Castelo Branco 1976, ‘tyler . ; Source: 
Malan and Bonelli (1983) . 
1980) - 
of private finance in 
total finance of capital 
goods inports 
To share $f Pin 1970 to 498 an 1978. 
Local credit. conditions for the 
goods were less favourable than 
those granted by 
2 oF apt local funds 
were available only for a 
fraction of 
total local production of 
capital goods (probably le





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































The bias against local production of capital goods imparted 
economic policy of the pericd via prices and eredit is 
PY ee th the other main traits of the strategy for economic 
en an development of the regime ~ to maximize short term 
a deel ive as a legitimizing factor) based on the durable 
a Ao ae industry and on foreign credit. In this sense, the 
eee tn imports reflects the economic and political conditions surge
of the periad. 
i £ imports of capital goods 
1 soso rectnoted only to the policies above mentioned. Part 
Sa ace re for parts and components to be used by local 
nodes ae aflecting one of the weaknesses of the Brazilian 
ee ercatat st ucture the undevelopment of the network of suppliers, 
ane deads on the one hand,to a high degree of vertical whic! s 
nte ration of the larger firms (see belo
w) and,on the other, to 
i g 
imports. 
other part of imports can be attributed to gaps vene
ete the 
1 aesign and production’ capability and demand requireman 
. : 
men in turn, deeply influenced by the use of importe 
ie tetent one of equipment by the main purchasers of c
apital 
ne subsidiaries acting in the durable consumer 
se tnteen diary industry and State enterprises providing 
ee nana services and intermediary products. As shown by 
See eer 197 the former were responsible for the majority 
Tee ee af sevies produced machinery and the latt
er for the 
OF ee ate tom-built capital goods. Part of the 
imports of 
see vies 2 be attributed to their strategy of standardizing 
eS echecloay world-wide and possibly also to intra-group 
eau one omeek fications of equipments used by State a
gencies 
aan S the relative undevelopment of engineerin
g firms in 
aera, onsen wewelly performed only the detail
 engineering Brazil,
qd itivities of the projects, leaving the basic design an acti 
(1) According to data from pated mes ite reased heir chavs in total eletrical eects Frc 16 to 28 percent between 1971 and 1975. 




equipment specifications to foreign contractors (Pord et al.1977). 
This division of labour has been shown (Erber 1974, Alves and 
Ford 1975} to be highly influence@ by the financing structure of 
the projects, with foreign funding (inclusive by international 
agencies) biasing choices in fayour of imported Plant design and 
specifications (besides imported capital goods) . Therefore, 
although “pure” gap-imports certainly existed, as in every 
economy, a part of them are a result of entrepreneurial strategies 
and economic policies which strenghten the undevelopment of loca) 
production and design capabilities in the capital goods industry 
and related engineering services in what amounts to be a vicious 
circle, since the above-mentioned capabilities are Geveloped 
through experience, which imports prevent. 
Nonetheless, and this is important to stress, the expansion 
of imports did not prevent the internal production of Capital 
goods from growing. In fact, during the period 1968/74, the local output of capital goods increased at as petacular yearly rate of 18.3%, well- above the average of industry. Thus the domestic content supply of capital goods at its lowest 
68.4% of total consumption, 
80% (see Table 4). 
point (1975) was 
increasing in later years to about 
Such domestic Supply ratios are co: 
larger economies such as the Pederal Re 
the same year) and Italy (77% in 1978). 
mparable to those of much 
public of Germany (848 in 
substitution of the fifties, i 
the further development of the industry, as shown by period we haye just Giscussed. In the latter the main factor leading to 
qv) Mane United States the domestic suppl ratio 92 cent i Data from UNCIAD (1982) . ¥ ratio was 92 per tn 1977.
18. 
the development of the capital goods industry were the a eeetdin 
i trial relationships in a process similar to that prev g 
tn an a capitalist countries. Nonetheless, as we have seen, 
in veeoutal goods industry in Brazil is responsible for a much the ca 
ler share of industrial output than in those economies (see smaller 
le 1), in spite of its growth. This differentia s a e / ° s p . 
nee catved considerable attention in the ‘explanation of t has re 
of the cycle in the aftermath of the "miracle" and we downswing 




6 The crisis: inter-industrial relatio
ns and the new fore gn 
exchange constraint 
One of the first "development economists" to focus peen
erny 
he role played by interindustrial relationships in : 
e 
seentes ¢ dustrialization was Hirschman (1958). Building 
San concn of “backward” and "forward" inter-industrial 
veo ace oe thal dynamic effects in terms of inducing investment, 
ne veeed in favour of investing in industries which 
ne eee ant vnediaxy and capital goods rather than consumer goods, 
Pros t « cooner presented higher combined linkages and, 
vhecetone had a greater impact upon investments 
in other 2: ’ 
industries. 
While Hixrschman's argument was essentially of a prescrip
- 
the theme of the interindustrial investment 
Sr. ee vived in the early seventies,when the 
pattern 
eae ie tonrene teh had emerged in Latin America after the period 4 
a Se eee eetitution was critically assessed by the "dependence" of import s 
analysts. 
Although the battle for gndustrialization had been won, 
ts combatents it was a Pyrrhic victory. Contraty to 
for many of its f fifties, the pattern of development was the optmistic hopes aoe, even where capital accumulation had been by and lexge “pervert (after the recession of 1963/67), it was 
resumed, as 
based upon the production of durable consumer goods and upon 
as increasingly unequal incame distribution, often enforced by 
authoritarian political regimes. Moreover, it was led by foreign 
‘enterprises, backed up by heavy state investments with the 
national bourgeoisie playing a secondary (albeit profitable) role. 
This new pattern of development led to a change in the links 
between hegemonic and dependent economies and, according to the 
“dependence” authors, technology, capital goods and finance were 
now the main links in the new "web of dependence", 
In an early formulation (Cardoso 1973), the underdevelopment 
of the local capital goods industry and the reliance on imported 
technology were seen as limiting the process of capitalist 
development of the periphery, since the Department I Of such 
economies (the sector producing means of production), was said 
to be virtually non-existent there, preventing a productive 
complementarity required by capital accumulation and draining the 
dynamic stimula to the central economies. The Brazilian case 
showed this to be an over-~simplification: an internal technical 
capability‘) and the production or capital goods developed with the process of industrialization. 
Although they are critical of the “dependency theory* general frame of analysis, Some recent studies of the dynamics of capital accumulation in the context of an LDC “Late* capitalist deve lopment have emphasized precisely the role played by the relationship between the Capital goods industry and other sectors, Using a Kaleckian scheme to explain the cyclical] nat ure of such development (e.g. Tavares {1978), Tavares and Belluzzo (1979). 
Such studies argue that the relative Small size of the capital goods sector in such an economy prevents the CGI of Playing the dynamic role it fulfills in the q 
€conomies via the multiplier anda accele 
increased productivity. 
eveloped capitalist 
rator effects ang via 
Thus, the effects of an autonomous investment {either by enterprises producing consumer goods or hy State enterprises producing intermediary goods) which are 
(1) See below, Section 7,
+20. 
transmitted to the capital goods industry and fed back by this 
industry into the rest of the economy via its cwn investment, which 
increases employment ‘1 (and thus the demand for other goods 
and 
services), productivity (by offering new vintages of more: 
efficient capital goods) and purchases of other goods and services 
(enlarging, among others, the capital goods itself), ara, according 
to such authors, much smaller in a LDC than 
in a developed economy. 
Therefore, in a LDC there is a pr
opensity for the dynamic 
effects of an autonomous investmen
t to be dissipated eee 
on than in an advanced economy and, since bo
th in intermediary an 
consumer goods {mainly durable consumer) t
here is a trend to 
invest in capacities which are ahe
ad of demand (because of 
indivisibilities and/or oligopolistic 
competition) such economies 
have a deep-seated propensity for sharp 
cycles. When autonomous 
investments are being made in consumer
 and intermediary eee 
economic activity increases sharply beca
use of the size of suc 
investments relative to the already 
installed capacity, only to 
contract sharply too when their firs
t-order effects are over. 
In an economy, such as Brazil, where the 
leading sector ts 
producing durable consumer goods using ca
pital-intensive techniques 
and, at the same time, the average income is 
low, policies of 
income concentration'*? and of 
financing the purchases of such 
ds may be instrumental to foster capital accumula
tion during the 
goo m 
: albeit at a very high social cost, but cannot prevent a 
oneep ae in Under such conditions 
the phase of expansion takes 
ee noneetaiiy "perverse" 
form in terms of income distribution 
2 pocial equity which is aggravated 
in the recession by 
unmitigated unemployment 
  
(1) ‘The capital goods industry is relatively lab
or-intensive and uses higly 
skilled and highly paid manpaver. 
. 
it is well knam Brazilian income distribut
ion is especially skewed 
2) ma Government policies rendered 
it worse, especially during the boom 
period. 
; 
(3) ‘There are no wemploymen
t benefits in Brazil. 
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Although imports of capital goods can be 
interpreted as 
a further “drain” from the dynamic point of view
, they are not 
a necessary condition for this argument ~ even with au
tarky 
in capital goods supply, the dynamics of capital accumulat
ion would 
be stunted if the relative size of the industry were small. 
The argument can be further extended 1£ me look at the 
carachteristics of the network of activities for designing and 
preductng capital goods discussed above -the relative undevelopment 
in Brazil {and in other LDCs, as sham by UNCTAD (2982)) of the 
network of suppliers and engineering services on the one 
hand reduce the inter-industrial linkages and,on the other ,reduce 
the productivity on the system,by leading the capital gocds 
enterprises to a much higher vertical integration than their 
counterparts in advanced countries, losing the"economies of specia- 
Lization® which are a proeminent feature of the industry (Rosenberg 
1963). 
Finally, this argument draws the attention to the problems 
of the financial system of the country to finance the production 
and purchase of locally~produced capital goods. If such system is 
not able to provide for such financing, investment may be postponed 
or not made at all or purchases of capital goods may diverted 
abroad. This may happen withouth a savings constraint, since 
Savings may exist but be oriented to other uses (e.g. the purchase 
of durable consumex goeds). 
Such analysis, which shift the focus from the foreign 
exchange constraint to the inter-industrial relationships and to 
the role played by internal financing conditions was developed for. 
the Brazilian case, but it may he relevant to other LDCs as well, 
In fact, Fajnzylber (1983) has Suggested that the relative 
undevelopment of the capital goods industry is one of the main 
distinguishing traits of the industrialization of LDCs. 
Thus, from the prospective of the authors mentioned above; a 
Slow-down in economic growth was to be expected after the leading
+22, 
durable consumer goods industries had completed their expansion by 
the mid-seventies and, in fact,the growth rates of the two groups 
of industries show a considerable reduction in the period 1975/78 
(see Table 3}. . 
The Government which took over in 1974.seemea intent precisely i 
to change this structure,since its Development Plan (1 PND) gave ¢ 
top priority to the complex of industries producing intermediary 4 
products and capital goods. According to the Plan thas vould, at 
the same time, reduce the foreign exchange constraint by 
increasing the domestic content of the supply of intermediary 
products and capital goods and increase the national control of 
the economy, since State enterprises would supply the intermediary 
products, directly or in joint ventures,and Brazilian private 
enterprises are important suppliers of capital goods, public 
works and engineering services. 
The story of the period cannot be dealt in detail here but 
its main traits illustrate the problems of trying to change the 
productive structure of the economy without changing its financial 
structure as well. 
The capital goods industry, especially the Brazilian enter- prises !?) sesponded to the prospects of the Plan by increasing their 
productive capacity sharply - the average fixed investment of 
projects presented to the Industrial Development Council by 
enterprises producing capital goods during the period 1974/76 was 
2.6 times greater than the average for the period 1971/73. over 
the same period the National Development Bank (BNDE) increased its 
loans to the capital goods industry in the same proportion 
(Erber, 1982). 
However, apart from increasing the funds of BNDE and ite subsidiaries, which is the main source of long-term finance to 
; i in 1973, showed a deficit of 
alance which was in equilibrium i  2 (1) tea taltions in 1974, caused by a jump in imparts from US$6.2 billions i next year, a fourth of which were of capital ne and tho intarmeaiany prowucts (ail-another 225. excluded) . 
dire ign investment shaw that the main expansion of foreign 7) etaratises lespertally in mechanical machinery ond shipbut Iding) earlicr in the cycle ~‘during the 1971/74 period (see Exber, 1982) . 
{3} Only Brazilian firms have access to the Banks’ fundg. 
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industry in Brazil, no major changes were made in the internal 
finance system to support the larges investments foreseen by the 
Plan, especially by the State. The financial policy, of the period 
rested upon a mounting public debt, based on open market operations 
and on a swelling external debt, which increased over five times 
between 1973 and 1978, most of which was pegged to floating interest 
rates !1) | As a consequence ,internal interest rates tended to increase in real terms over the period, stifling private investment further. 
Onder the double pressure of tising inflation and foreign exchange constraints (fuelled by increased oil Prices and mounting international interest rates) the ambitions of the Plan were abandonned in favour of a stop-~and-go policy, which lasted from 1977 to 1980, strongly influenced by political events'?) alehough the State curtailed its investments to control inflation ana instructed its enterprises to fund as much as possible the remaining projects from external sources, while internal interest rates were 
(Malan and Bonelli, 1983), The 
and public ang private investment 
Ocal output of Capital goods which £ 15% in the period 1931/82 (see 83 show that the reduction in ~ 
Brazil. 
(2) B.g, the Campaign in the press against the "excessive" 
the economy, 
role of the state in
224. 
and no evidence was available of a recovery (ipta.) Y) . pa
cing 
imto account only the production for the Brazilian
 market, by 
excluding exports, the fall is even more severe (see 
Table 4) - 
the 1982 level is less than two-thirds of the 1979 outpu
t. 
Imports of capital goods also fall, bu
t less sharply (ge 
imports are 87% of the 1979, after 
an increase in 1981) . 
relative inelasticity of imports is prob
ably due to same causes 
previously discussed, since the latter hav
e remained largely 
inaltered. 
This implies that even if there is scope for 
same import- . 
substitution in the Brazilian capLtal
 goods sneueerys te np’eren 
such policy would require acting up
on such factors, making Pp 
changes in economic and political con
ditions. : 
However there are three important differen
ces between the 
‘ 
. 
resent Brazilian situation and the fore
{gn exchange constraint 
a 
H wally treated in the literature of “devel
opment economics". 
norma 
Pirst there is the role played by the cap
ital goods industry 
in the foreign exchange constraint (
FEC). Contrary to other . 
ions of FEC, which appear at tines of expansion, the
 presen’ 
ae eeete has reduced the share of capital goods imports in to
tal 
sesenta, £ on the peak of 41% in 1971/72 to 17% in 1962. Moreover, 
ae nose important, the trade balance of 
the capital goods industry 
a weeadily improved - while in 19
70 Brazilian exports of capital 
epresented 13% of imports, in 1982 they w
ere greater than 
seen Pable 4). A recent study (Araujo 
Jr. and Reis, 1981) 
whos th Spout a third of such exports 
were purchased by OBCD 
ae ectes the rest, being sold to oth
er LDCs. The world recession 
co te B affected such exports causi
ng a reduction of more 
when 208 in their value from 1982 to 1981,
 more than proportional 
the arop in total Brazilian exp
orts (see Tables 4 and 5). 
ion of 1964/6? the internal capital goods (Q) in comparison, se ep gear at a Ge yearly rate, (Exber, 1977). 
(2) Nonetheless the domestic campa
nent in 1982 was still high ~- thr
ee-fouxths 
of total supply (see Table 4). 
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Secondly, there is the nature of the Brazilian present FEC, 
which has financial rather than trade roots. Differently from the 
traditional FEC of the development literature, the present Brazilian 
FEC is not to be found at balance of trade level, caused by an 
excess of imports over exports, but rather at the level of the 
balance of services and the capital account, caused by the service 
of debt and by the reduced ‘inflow of capital (see Table 6). The 
nature and magnitude of the Brazilian FEC are such that no 
improvements in the balance of trade!) can overcome it, if it 
is not accompanied by a drastic change in the conditions which . 
link the Brazilian economy to the international financial system. 
Finally, as a consequence, the main influence of the FEC 
upon the capital goods industry is not exerted via restriction on 
imports, as it is during an import-substituting model, when it 
stimulates the local production of goods, but rather through the 
recessionary effects it has upon the general level of economic 
activity which, then, reduce the demand for both imported and 
locally produced capital goods. 
7 - Exports and Technical Progress 
In the course of the recent decade capital goods exports 
have increased considerably - their value in 1982 Was over 26 
times greater than in 1970 (see Table 4). Their importance for the 
industry increase with the internal recession (ibid), so that in 
1982 they accounted for a fourth of total production, ana they 
also play a significant role in alleviating the forei gn exchange 
constraint of the econony, accounting in 1982 for 173 of total Brazilian exports (see Table 5). In international terms, Brazil has become of the main exporters among Locs 2 
total world trade is still marginal. 
(1) Capital goods exports accounted for 17% : period 1980/82, of total Brazilian exports in the 
(2) In 1979 Brazilian exports represented 15% of total capital 2 gocés exports by LDCs, roughly the same share of capital qoods producti Third (Araujo Jr. and Reis 1961 and ONCTAD 1982). Notion 4n the T Nerd 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Part of this growth may be due to price factors, since 
Brazilian export prices rose less than the average (see Table Nn, 
reflecting both the competitiveness of Brazilian firms and the 
Government fiscal and credit incentives to exports. However, 
several studies of Brazilian export performance have attributed 
this success to technological factors (Araujo Jr. and Reis 1981, 
Araujo Jr. et al. 1983; Guimaraes et al. 1983), 
Other authors (e.g. Lall 1982), building upon the experience 
of Brazil and other NICs (especially Korea ané India) argue that 
the technological development achieved by such LDCs through “minor 
innovations" in the capital goods industry and engineering services is an indicator of their dynamic comparative advantages and that a 
new international division of labour is emerging, in which "the comparative advantage of developed versus developing countries will be determined not so much by skili requirements in general, but by skill inputs based on Specific learning processes which cannot be replicated in developing countries" {Lall 1982, P-174, origina} emphasts}) . 
The technological development of the 
industry has been studied by many authors { 
1982, among the most recent ones 
Brazilian Capital goods 
e.g. Cruz 1983 , Erber 
}. Such studies show that the 
activities for a vtange of products, based on the tradition metalworking in Brazil‘? 
r i 
and on processes of Copying-and-adapting. 
complex products. 
Part of the shift to the imported technology can be attributed 
(1) See Erber (1977 ang 1981} for a
TABLE 7 - PRICE INDEXES OF CAPITAL GOODS EXPORTS FROM 
BRAZIL, JAPAN,FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND 





wear ait "0 @ {4} {5} (A) 
1970 63 68 49 76 68 ‘1.08 (200) 
1971 67 2 55 7 67 1.06 [ 93) 
1972 7 71 62 78 69 0.97 { 90) 
1973 81 8? 73 80 76 0.94 ( 87) 
1974 91 97 87 91 90 0.99 ( 92) 
1975 190 100 100 100 100 1.00 ( 93) 
1976 103 98 103 107 105 1.02 { 94) 
1977 12 104 nis ua 110 0.98 ( 91) 
1978 129 126 137 123 116 0.90 ( 83) 
1979 139 “(124 155 134 ya 0.87 ( 81) 
Source - Araujo Jr. and Reis (1981). 
29. 
to technical factors, since “reverse engineering” is areei cuss se 
apply when the gap between the previous experience of the fm an 
current requirements of design and manufacturing are large énd 
time for learning is short. In this sense, the steep upswing of 
demand in the Brazilian two cycles of the post-war period and the 
shift of deman@ from the non-durable consumer goods industry to the 
durable consumer and intermediary sectors probably created a gap 
of time—and-requirements which induced the use of imported technoloacy. 
Moreover the main purchasers of capital goods in the vericd used 
mainly continuous flow processes, where "reverse engineering” of ; 
machinery is more difficult to perform, especially in the absence 
of engineering services (plant design and specification) 
Capabilities. 
The literature on the industry (especially Erber 1977, 1982) 
has shown that the import of technology does entail the development 
of a local technological Capability - in fact it argues that such 
capability is inherent to the licensing relationship. On the other 
hand it also shows that such learning is limited, so as ta 
preserve the relationship. This should be no cause of surprise if 
one considers the rationale of the exporter of technology. 
Exporters of technology have a deep-seated interest in 
ensuring that their customers possess some technological 
capabilities, since their earnings are usually pegged to the latters sales and because the responsibilities of Ifcensor and licensee are very difficult to apportion in cases of failure 
etc. which may jeopardize the licensor's inte 
Thus, the importer of technology must be at 1 
manufacture the goods and/or operate the 
Specifications, failing which the licenso 
how to do it. 
’ breakages, 
rnational reputation. 
€ast ahle to 
processes according to the- 
x must teach the licensee 
Moreover, in order that a product can be manufactured, all its parts and components must be Specified to minute detail, and such specification must conform to the available supply of materials, parts and components, as well as to the specific production conditions of the local manufacturer, Therefore, the
stage of detailed deaign') is better performed lecally where the 
preduct is to be manufactured, than abroad, where the Licensor 
is located. For all parties, then, it is desirable that the 
licensee should know how to produce detailed designs. 
Although manufacturing know-hoy and detailed design skills 
are a necessary condition for intraducing innovations {as well as 
for production), they are not sufficient for purposes of 
innovation: basic design skills are necessary for innovation. 
Moreover, the mastery of the first two skills does not lead 
necessarily to a basic design capability: although in some 
products, especially mechanical products, it is often possible to 
progress from one to the other; in others, notedly in products 
which perform atomic or molecular transformation, there -is a 
(1) The design of a machine goes through three main stages (Asimov, 1962): 
ity - The design process starts fram a need recognition. Such 
” Bee then Samertad ‘int the essential functions the equipment must 
perform ang the latter expressed by specific performance requirements 
(e.g. capacity of containnent and support) . If, by confronting the 
resources available to the fixm with such requirements and other 
constraints (e.g. delivery time), the enterprise decides that the 
equipment is feasible, it may end up with a set of feasib ign 
concepts from which one will be chosen in the next stage. 
i i design”, this is, technically, 
4) ate ee importan . Se ose ithe design proctes since it involves not 
only the choice of the design concept to be imped but also the 
speci fication of the structure af the equipment arrangement. 0 
its parts) and the definition of the materials, svb-assenb. 
components to be used in its manufacture. ‘The main clemen ts which 
detemnine the competitive possibilities of a machine (technica 
performances, oost and delivery time) are defined at this stage. 
ign ~ here main consideration is to pr vide information 
a) for pacduction as each part is drawn in detail to be mamfactured,with hasis being placed upon dimensions and tolerances. 
. 
i il) depend on largely importance of the three stages of design will depen rf the novelty of the prod the empuasis is cn optimization of the chatetertstics Kenan to Oe ee reliminary design stage, the importance of feasibility 
increasing with the novelty of the product. ‘ 
terms ‘tegor. more often used in the literature on 
Lieewations ancording to intaretional definitions (e-g, the Peewee 
Manual of the CECD) the feasibility and basic design stages should be 
included in “developrent", as long as the design is for a oer product, but. 
detailed design should be excluded. For a fuller analysis @ design stages 
and technical references, see Erber (1977). 
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discontinuity of Knowledge between basie design on the one hand and 
detailed and Manufacturing technology on the other. 
Since, basic design skills are not necessary for producing 
the goods, the exporter of technology has no interest in closing 
Buch gap; quite the contrary, the teaching of such skills could 
foreclose a future source of revenues and even nurture a future 
competitor, especially where technical progress is incremental and 
engineering-based as in the capital goods sector. The same applies 
to the skills for the feasibily stage of design, For branches 
where innovation is not only design - intensive but also science- 
based, such as életronics, the transfer Of technolagy is much more 
Limited, 
Thus, licensing does provide for learning but it is partial learning - a type of learning which, at the same time, ensures 
the licensor’s revenues and the continuation of the relationship over time. Such technical control is strenghtenea by legal provisions: as it is well known, technology is not sold, but leaseg -— the owner of the technology does not forsake the property of the technolagy, only allows the licensee to use it for a limited duration of time, under certain conditions, some of which may by quite restrictive (export prohibitions, tied-in imports, etc). Such legal control applies even in the absence of patents, although the latter strenghtens it. 
The same pattern of limited le arning was observed in the case of foreign subsidiaries, where the parent company had to transfer a 
Uggests that this strategy 
“economies in the production of tech but also to the extraordinary profits they. reaped through “technplogy-related® iatra-firm transactions (vVaitsos 1974, Fajnzyloer and Tarragd 1976). 
Was not only due to scale 
nology
+32. 
In fact, one of the main questions posed by this literature 
was: since the local entrepreneurs were aware of such limitations 
(as shown by the research) and of the costs they entailed (tied-in 
imports, export prohibitions, threats of being ousted from the 
market by a subsidiary after the licensee had tested the market, 
or having to pay for the technology in equity; at least relinquishing 
the control of some important decisions), why did they not invest 
more in their own technology, walking, so to. speak "on two legs"? 
The answer showed that many factors were at work, among which 
six ranked especially high: 
- The competition of foreign technology, which, being easily 
imported, put a high risk on attempting to develop local technology, 
especially where lead times were longer and costs higher. Government 
policies related to foreign investment, imports of capital goods 
(where project financing played a crucial role) an@ import of 
disembodied technology were important determinants of such 
competition, 
- The pressure of clients. which often made the use of 
imported technology a conditio sine qua non, barring thus the 
possibility of developing local technology. This was especially 
observed in Brazil for capital goods and engineering services, 
inclusive for State enterprises purchases. 
- The structures of the markets where such enterprises 
operated, which placed a premium an the monopoly they were granted 
by the licensor, and also allowed them to pass on to the customers 
the cost of the technology imported. 
- The size of the local market, relative to the expenditures 
necessary to develop local technology and the lack of protection of 
such technology. 
- The short term horizon with which local enterprises 
operated, in many cases due to the lack of planning by the State. ’ 
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- The political outlook of local enterpreneurs, who were more 
afraid of being controlled by the State than by foreign firms. 
Thus, at one level of analysis, the answer was that the 
dynamics of economic and political forces was such that there was 
no incentive to the local entrepreneurs {and even less to 
subsidiaries of foreigh firms) to develop a technological 
Capability beyond that provided by technological transfer. This 
conclusion could be used to justify State intervention to foster 
such further development - and {t often was. 
The preceding analysts has, however, further implications to 
Carachterize the specificity of the development of LoCs. First it 
argues that the import of technology (similarly to the import of 
capital goods} is a necessary conditions in phases of fast capital 
accumulation and structural change, But, second, it points out that 
such technology imports prevent the local capital goods industry 
from playing the same role in the "virtuous circle” of growth of the developed economies, since the CGI is unable ta generate or fully absorb the whole range of technological capabilities, and the links between the industry, engineering services and other activities are only partially established, creating a “vicious circle" of 
undeve lopment, 
The same limitations impinge upon the thesis that the nics could rely upon their technological capability in Gapital goods and engineering services to break the foreign exchange constraint, fashioning a "new international order“. Such Capability is, as use have seen, structurally limited ana its relevance for the insertion of such countries in the international division of labour: is likely to be further reduced in the future, t 
Although the way out of the 
it is clear that it will be associ 
technical basis of the world eco: 
present cycle is not in sight, 
ated with a deep change in the 
nomy, Of which some aspects are
+34, 
Electronics is well know, based upon large-scale scientific 
activity on the frontiers of technology and its activities are to 
a considerable extent aimed at meeting changing needs of high-income, 
brand-conscious consumers, activities in which the LDCs have no \ 
comparative advantagens. The resources used for innovation in those $ 
industries are highly concentrated in the advanced countries and the 
theory and experience of diffusion of innovations strongly suggest 
that the rate of diffusion of such innovations will be much faster 
in the centre than in the LDCs, widening their gap; not only in 
research and development but also in manufacturing 
technology. 
Moreover the diffusion of eletronics will affect many of 
the activities in which the NICs could have comparative advantages 
as regards both more and less-developed countries than them. 
This 
applies, for instance for the simpler (non-eletronic) 
machine-tools 
and the labour-intensive detailed design services they would sell
 
to the a@vanced countries {Lall 1982), which are likely to be 
replaced by numerically-controlled machine tools 
and computer-aided 
design'?), produced more efficiently in the central countr
ies. The 
latter may also prove to be strong competitors i
n the markets o£ 
the least developed countries (markets not to be overlo
oked in the 
present crisis), since eletronics will reduce the costs of adapt
ation 
of designs and of scaling-down of process and equipmen
t to snit the 
specific needs of such countries ! * 
Another cycle-related factor which may reduce the technology 
exports Of LDCs is theix capacity to finance them. 
The present 
balance of payments problems faced by countries such as Brazil,
 
Mexico, Argentina, Korea, will probably undermine fu
rther their 
technology export capability by reducing their capacit
y to finance 
such exports in conditions similar to those provided 
by the more 
advanced countries. 
(1) For evidence on the gap of diffusion of eletro
nic-based capital goods 
tween central and peripheral econaules see, among others, UNCTAD (1982),
 
Pautle (1983). For computer-aided Gesign see Kaplinsky (1982).
 
As it is well known, one of the min features of the eletronic innovations 
2 is that they break the link between automationand large-scale producti, 
allowing for the automation of batch production, 
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Pinally, the present phase of the cycle may leac to a 
reduction of the technological capability of the LDCs, not only 
in relative terms (the widening gap argument outlined above) 
but also in absolute terms, by two mechanisms. The first is the 
closure of local firms, unable to resist the international 
exisis and the restrictive policies local Governments have put 
in practice to control infldtion and balance the external account 
(at least in Latin America). The sectors producing the goods and 
services composing the technology exports are likely to be 
specially affected, given the role played by their local public 
enterprises demand for their survival. The drastic cut-down in 
public investment in such countries finds no compensation from 
increased exports, since protectionist and/or contractionist 
policies are spreading, with feed-back effects ')) | The closure 
of such enterprises means the liquidation of a technical capability 
which will take long to reconstruct, even when the new upswing 
comes. (Cruz, 1983}. 
The second mechanism is the shift of manufacturing from 
LDCs to the central countries by multinational companies. 
Stimulated by the new possibilities of automation Opened up by 
electronics and by an increased weight attached to product “quality 
in competition, this seems to be already hapening in eletronic 
semiconductor production (Rada 1982). It is Still unclear haw 
extensive this phenomenon will be but it clearly abodes bad for 
the capital goods and related services technology and preduction 
Capabilities of the LDts. . 
The conclusion that technological dependence is just part of a specific pattern of development is also important to avoid some pitfalls of technological determinism - it is not Simply by 
changing the degree of technological self-reliance that this pattern of development will be vadically transformed - a “naive optmism" often found, in the literature. The determinants of technological : dependence have to be sought not only at the level of the lack 
(1) For instance, one of the leading chine 
o e renufachmers of may i i recently went into receivership when their Mexican market closed pret reduction of investment of OrE i i 
the techng exports, © countries will also reduce the markets for
-36. 
of technical and scientific skills in Lpc's (although they 
may be a 
powerful constraint in some cases) but especially 
at the level of 
the economic and political considerations which guide the action of 
the enterprises and of the State as regards the development of 
local technical capabilities.This view also leads 
to a reassessment 
o£ the role explicit science and technology policies may 
have in 
changing the technological dependence. When 
such policies do not 
converge with the other policies {e.g. policies related to fo
reign 
investment) their efficacy is severely limited, since they alone, 
cannot change the pressures and 
inducements {some of which were 
mentioned above) which lead the enterprises 
to rely mainly on 
imported technology. 
This argument seems to be applicable to another major s
trand 
jin the literature - that the development of a capit
al goods industry 
in the LDCs is justifiable if such development 
would lead to the 
use of more labour-intensive technologies 
and to the preduction of 
goods and services more appropriate to the level of
 income of the 
bulk of the population in such countries. 
Although such use of the 
technological and manufacturing capabilities of the
 capital gacods 
industry is highly desirable from the point
 of view of equity and 
social welfare, it faces as a necessary condition a drastic change
 
in the political and economic conditions which rule the
 present 
pattern of development of Brazil and other LDCs. 
8 - The CGI and the pattern of development _of LDCs
 ~ some 
conclusions 
fhe issue of the specificity of the patternal develofment 
of LDCs is one of the most important dividing lines between authors 
which deal the problems of development. Some authors have argued 
that, if unimpeded, capitalism tends to reproduce itself on 
a 
world-wide scale, generating similar productive and distribution 
structures (e.g. Rostow, 1960) while others have stressed the 
specificity of the insertion of LbCs in the international division 
of labour in terms of commercial, investment and financial 
37. 
relationships which, coupled to their internal produ
ctive and 
distribution structures (strongly influenced by their colonial 
heritage), fashion a pattern of development which is not o
nly 
specific but more limited than that of the "central" economies
. 
The analysis of the Brazilian capital goods industry!) 
lends weight to the second group of authors. Although Brazil is the 
largest producer of capital gocds in the Third World, its capital 
goods industry does not seem able to play the same role in the 
dunamics of capital accumulation and technical progress it does in 
the advanced countries, nor to break the foreign exchange , 
constraint of the economy. 
The limited development of the local capital goods production 
and technology is the result of many, inter-related, factors among 
which are worth stressing the financial structure of the econony 
and the interindustrial relationships. The former has given a new 
character and strenght to the foreign exchange constraint and, 
thus, to the relationships between Brazil, the advanced countries and 
the international financial system, which now play a decisive role 
in the internal development of the capital goods industry. The 
latter are based upon highly skewed income and wealth distributions. 
To change both, so that the capital goods industry fulfills the 
same role it does in advanced countries would require very deep 
changes in the economic social and political structures of the 
Brazilian society and in the way the Brazilian economy is articulated 
to the international system. such changes would indeed require a 
great change in the Brazilian pattern of development and, last but 
not least, in the way the i Yy nternational economic and political 
systems are structured and operate. 
  
{2} The same applies to the related engineering services,
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